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I. INTRODUCTION
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I Workers' compensation acts are usually characterized as a "compromise" whereby employees have traded an uncertain, expensive, but occasionally highly rewarding tort action for a
certain, inexpensive, but limited recovery of a fraction of lost wages plus medical expenses. The
employer has traded potentially open-ended liability for a strict, limited, shared liability system.
A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PATr, C. VuLTz & R. BOMBAGH, AtrrOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND
PAYMENTS

75 (1964) (hereinafter cited as A. CoN~AR]; 1 A. LARSON,

WORCMEN'S COMPENSATION

2 (1978); Note, New Policies Bearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from LossSharing, 29 ME. L. REV. 243, 246-67 (1978); see Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 50, 69
N.E.2d 557, 558 (1946).
Today, workers' compensation provisions have been enacted by every state as well as by the
federal government. State workers' compensation programs differ significantly as to such features as their elective or compulsory character, the industries covered, the limits on recovery of
loss, and whether they wholly replace or merely "add on" to the common law. Typically,
however, workers' compensation programs eliminate common law employer liability to injured
employees as well as the common law employer defenses. Instead, they provide for certain, noLAW
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ployees suffering work-related injuries. 2 Today, important changes
from fault to no-fault principles are in process or are being contem-

plated in other areas of tort law. For example, in a wave reminiscent
of the substantial acceptance given workers' compensation statutes
from 1911-1920, 3 no-fault automobile accident liability statutes are in
force in twenty-eight states 4 with additional proposals pending.5 Simi-

lar plans have been proposed to offset the problems surrounding

fault employee recovery for work-related injuries, "ideally" in the amount of 100% of medical
expenses and 662/3 % of wage income loss. Recovery for pain and suffering is not allowed. There
are frequently ceilings on maximum income loss recovery and limitations on the period of time
for which an injured employee may recover even though his losses and income need may
continue. See infia note 64.
Questions of coverage (liability) and the amount of liability are determined in an administrative proceeding intended to resolve claims in a more expeditious, efficient, and uniform
manner, and in an atmosphere less adversary in nature. Nonetheless, considerable litigation
regarding questions of coverage and benefits does occur. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's
Compensationas Social Insurance:A Review of Developments and Proposals,1963 Wis. L. Rv.
57, 63-73; see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WOucKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS Rs'olr 99-100
(1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPorr]; NEW YoRK UNiVERSrrY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY 9-13 (1960).
Employers are generally required to purchase insurance, post bonds, or make other showing
of financial ability to meet potential liability under the various workers' compensation statutes
for employee injuries. Furthermore, to the extent they have made payment under workers'
compensation, employers or their insurers are typically subrogated to the claims of their injured
employees against negligent third parties. The extent to which negligent employers may be held
liable, on a theory of contribution or indemnity, to third parties sued by employees on grounds of
traditional negligence turns largely on statutory construction, and is an area of the law currently
undergoing considerable evolution.
Under federal law, the United States Government is generally required to "pay compensation ... for the disability or death of [its employees] resulting from personal injury sustained
while in the performance of [their duties]." 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1976). Similar legislation
requires that common carriers engaged in interstate commerce compensate any employee "suffering injury" while "employed by such carrier." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). Likewise, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act mandates that employees injured while
working on "the navigable waters of the United States" be compensated for their injuries. 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
2 NEW YORK COMM'N ON EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY, FuroT REPoirr 19-36 (1911) [hereinafter
cited as WAINWIGHT REPoirr]; see E.H. DOWNEY, WORMrEN's COMPENSATION (1924); Rhodes,
The Inception of Workmen's Compensationin the United States, 11 ME. L. REv. 35 (1917); infra
notes 13-19, 27-33 and accompanying text.
3 By 1920, forty states had adopted compensation acts and on January 1, 1949, the last
state, Mississippi, enacted compensation laws. I A. LmASON, supra note 1, at 39; Brodie, supra
note 1, at 63.
4 The states which have enacted such statutes are as follows: Arkansas; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Kansas; Kentucky; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; North Dakota- Oregon;
Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; South Carolina; South Dakota; Texas; Utah; Virginia; Washington;
Wisconsin.
5 See Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation,
1973 UTAH L. REv. 341; O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of Surveys, 56
NEB. L. REV. 23, 26-28 (1977).
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medical malpractice6 and products liability suits. 7

727
In New Zealand,

an ambitious plan of social insurance against personal injury has been
adopted. 8 In the same spirit, systems providing universal no-fault
accident insurance have recently been proposed in this country.9
Advocates of these proposals point to the uncertainty, expense,
delay, and inadequacy of recovery characteristic of litigation in the
negligence system. Because, in the public mind, even negligent workers must be given minimum ("poverty level") support, it is argued that
the objectionable negligence lottery should be replaced with a compensation program funded by general revenues or by insurance purchased by those who would be litigants in the negligence system. It is
further asserted that this change would free congested courts, discourage malingering, and hasten rehabilitation. Moreover, with the elimination of attorneys' fees, it is argued that there will be additional
money available to compensate victims.10
While conceding that the tort system could be improved, its
proponents argue that it is a more equitable and effective deterrent of

6 Malpractice reform proposals have largely centered around statutory limitations of damage awards and artibration of claims. Many commentators, however, have proposed that nofault principles be applied. E.g., Note, Strict Liability: The Medical Malpractice Citadel Still
Stands. 11 CnREcTON L. REV. 1357, 1371-73 (1978); Note, Malpracticein Dealing with Medical
Malpractice?,6 Mrm. ST. U.L. REv. 437, 445-52 (1976); see Lewis, MedicalMalpracticeReform
Legislation, 1978 ANN. Smvw. Am. L. 255.
7 U.S. DW,'T OF COMMERCE INERACENCY TASK FORCE ON PRoDUCTs LIABILITY, FINAL REPeorr V11-202 to VI1-240 (1977); see J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT
INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 141-44 (1975); Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat?
A Response to the Products Liability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251 (1978); Freedman, No-Fault and
ProductsLiability: Can One Live Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 100, 123-29 (1976); Freedman,
No-Fault and Products Liability: An Answer to a Maiden's Prayer, 1975 INs. L.J. 199, 203-08.
' Franklin, Personal Injury Accident Compensation in Australia and New Zealand, 27
STAN. L. REV. 653 (1975); Harris, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive
Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REv. 361 (1974); Palmer, The Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1974, 6 N.Z.L. REV. 299 (1975); Palmer & Lemons, Toward the Disappearanceof Tort
Law-New Zealand's New CompensationPlan, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 693 (1972); Smith, Products
Liability: A Compendium of Reform, 15 Hous. L. REV. 871, 890 (1978); Vennell, The Scope of
National No-Fault Accident Compensation in Australia and New Zealand, 49 Aus. L.J. 22
(1975).
The concept of social insurance to provide compensation to accident victims is not a new
idea. Holmes once stated: "The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company
against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizen's mishaps among all its members." 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (1881).
g j. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 73; J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, ToRT LAw, NoFAULT AND BEYOND 727-30 (1975); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation
and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
10For various views, see G. CALABRESI, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS 1 (1970); Franklin, supra
note 9; Keeton, The Casefor No-Fault Insurance, 44 Miss. L.J. 1 (1973); supra notes 6-9 & infra
notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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accidents because it allocates the costs of accidents to those best able to
prevent them.1 '
Lacking from most discussion of the fault and no-fault alternafives is the use of empirical comparisons based on the actual operations of the two systems. 2 The purpose of this article is to introduce
some empirical tests for assessing the alleged advantages and disadvantages of the negligence and strict liability systems by focusing on a
comparison of workers' compensation and traditional negligence. To
this end, an analytical framework will be presented which may be
used to evaluate the data. Finally, some suggestions will be made as a
basis for further evaluation of the "fault/no-fault" controversy.
II. BRIEF HISTORY

OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE

SURROUNDING CONTROVERSY

The nineteenth century industrialization of our economy complicated the causes and increased the risks of accidents. 3 Buttressed by
11See infra

notes 37 & 91-94 and accompanying text.

12 We know of only one attempt to compare empirically workers' compensation and the

negligence approach: James R. Chelius's study of the effect of employers' liability laws and
workmen's compensation on occupational death rates. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LECAL STUD. 293 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Chelius, Comparison]. The study is limited to an analysis of deterrence
effects, exemplified by data on machine-related death. The negligence and workers' compensation systems are not compared in terms of the objectives of benefit adequacy or program
efficiency. See id. at 306.
In another empirical study conducted by Chelius, evidence is set forth which, according to
the author, indicates that a higher proportion of compensation to injured employees is associated
with higher accident rates. Chelius, The Control of IndustrialAccidents: Economic Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 700, 714 (1974).
Of course, at the time of the initial enactment of workers' compensation, some empirical
data relating to poor recovery and other perceived defects in the common law were available.
See C. EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910) (empirical analysis of work-related
accidents in Pittsburgh). At that time, however, there was no large data base on the operation of
workers' compensation so that meaningful comparisons were not possible.
In comparing workers' compensation and the common law it replaced, the New York
Commission on Employers' Liability found that although the inspection and fine system then
prevailing in New York did not work to deter accidents (for reasons of inadequate penalties and
enforcement budgets), such accident deterrence was provided by civil liability. NEw YoRK
COMM'N ON EMPLOYERS' LIABIITY, SECOND RPORT 8 (1911) (hereinafter cited as NEw YonK
COMM'N SECOND REPoRT]; See WAINWRIGHT REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; infra note 76. Later
studies on workers' compensation generally focused on the operation of the system in isolation
rather than comparing it to the common law system it replaced. See NEw YORK UNIvEnsrry
WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION STUDY (1960).
In 1972 the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws sponsored many
studies pertaining to workers' compensation recovery. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying
text. Yet, the analysis of compensation received and recovery rates was based on hypothetical
instances of what injured workers would receive in various jurisdictions rather than on what
injured workers actually received.
13R. H. BLANCHARD, LLursrIY AND COMPENSATION INSURANCE 69-75 (1917); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 1, at 23 (1978); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LmERAL STATE 1900-
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the rationale that a worker's wages reflected the hazards of his employment, the tort law during that period has been characterized as
protecting developing industries at the expense of injured employees."1 Although the common law imposed upon employers important
duties to promote the safety of employees,' 5 three important defenses,
namely, contributory negligence,' 6 assumption of risk, 17 and the fellow servant rule,18 effectively insulated from liability even negligent
employers. These formidable defenses were reinforced by other factors which had the net result of leaving most employees with little
hope of recovery. For example, proving causation became increasingly difficult as the work environment grew ever more complex and
technical. Moreover, fellow employees were generally reluctant to
testify against their employer, thus making it difficult for the litigating employee to muster favorable testimony. Court proceedings were
expensive and protracted and the employer was generally represented
by better financed legal counsel. Employees frequently lacked education, fluency in English, and sufficient familiarity with our legal

1918, 40-41 (1968); MINNESOTA BUREAU or LABOR, TwE.FrH BIENNIAL REPORT 149-50 (1910)
[hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA REPo-r]; Brodie, supra note 1, at 57-59; Frankfurter, The
General Development of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 13 Ky. L.J. 20 (1924-25).
4 FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 21 (1917); Brodie, supra note 1, at 58;
Calabresi, Some Thoughts of Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 516
(1961); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29-34 (1972).
Is These duties were (1) to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place to work and safe
appliances, tools, and equipment; (2) to provide a sufficient number of suitable and competent
fellow employees to permit safe performance of work; (3) to warn employees of unusual hazards;
and (4) to establish and enforce proper safety rules. R. H. BLANCHARD, supra note 13, at 43-44; 1
A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 28; NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW,
COMPENDIUM ON WORUMEN'S COMPENSATION 11-12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMPENDIUM].
16 Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, employees who through their own negli-

gence contributed to their own accidents and injury, could not recover from their employers
even though the employer's negligence was a greater contributing factor to the accident. W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW or Tors, 527 (4th ed. 1971); see Schlemmer v. Buffalo,
Rochester & Pittsburgh R.R., 220 U.S. 590 (1911); Meunier v. Chemical Paper Co., 180 Mass.
109, 61 N.E. 810 (1901).
I7 According to the assumption of the risk rule, employees were deemed to assume the risk of
any accidents resulting from hazards normally incident to their employment and therefore could
not recover against an employer. W. PNossS, supra note 16, at 527-28; e.g., O'Maley v. South
Boston Gas Light Co., 158 Mass. 135, 32 N.E. 1119 (1893); Conway v. Furst, 57 N.J.L. 645, 32
A. 380 (1895); Kinsley v. Pratt, 148 N.Y. 372, 42 N.E. 986, reargumentdenied, 149 N.Y. 582, 43
N.E. 988 (1896).
Is The fellow servant rule, existing as an exception to the general principle of respondeat
superior, precluded recovery against an employer when the injury was caused by the negligence
of a fellow employee. The rule first appeared in England in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (1837). Soon thereafter, it was adopted in Massachusetts. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1849).
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system to seek effective assistance. 19 Confronted with these disabilities, the average employee had meager chances of an adequate recovery even in the event that he chose to press his claims.
Prior to the enactment of workers' compensation, dissatisfaction
with the negligence system led to judicial20 and legislative reform
aimed at facilitating recovery. At its strongest, the legislative response
was to enact "employers' liability statutes" which placed employees in
the same position as nonemployees if injured by employers or their
agents. 2 ' The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk survived this legislative development, but the fellow servant
rule was virtually eliminated by employers' liability statutes.2 2 Although often limited to specific industries, twenty-five states had
adopted employers' liability acts in some form by 1907.23
The movement toward improving the negligence system was
blunted, however, by a more fundamental departure from the traditional negligence approach in the form of workers' compensation
legislation. By 1921, the federal government and all but eight states
had passed workers' compensation statutes.2 4 These laws generally
limited employer liability for work-related injuries to a fixed percentage of lost wages and medical expenses, without regard to fault, and
25
excluded recovery for pain and suffering.
Since its inception in the United States, the workers' compensation system has been widely studied, receiving both support and criti', R. H. BLANCHARD, supra note 13, at 59, 63, 71 (litigation was protracted; there were
problems of proof; recovery was uncertain); CONNECrICUT COMM. REGARDING LEGISLATION
REGULATtN THE LLAIL&rr OF EMPLOYERS, Rssoirr 11 (1909) [hereinafter cited as CONNEcriCUT
RzPOrT] (employees lacked sufficient funds and experienced proof problems); E. H. DOWNEY,
supra note 2, at 5 (employees were uneducated foreigners); C. EAsTMAN, WoRK ACCIDENTS AND
THE LAW 190 (1910) (uncertain, protracted litigation); WAINWEIGHT REPorr, supra note 2, at 24,
29, 32-34 (employers had significant advantages due to greater finances and employee unwillingness to testify against employer).
20 Courts in some jurisdictions, for example, adopted the "vice principle" exception to the
fellow servant rule whereby recovery was possible for injury caused by supervisory personnel as
opposed to employees. E.g., Lamb v. Littman, 132 N.C. 978, 44 S.E. 646 (1903); Berea Stone v.
Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287 (1877). In other jurisdictions the common law duties, see supra note 15,
were nondelegable, thus permitting direct actions against the employer for breach of duty. E.g.,
Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886); Smith v. Erie R.R., 67 N.J.L. 636, 52 A.
634 (1902). Finally, in some jurisdictions, employees were not deemed to have assumed the risk
of employer noncompliance with safety statutes. E.g., Fitzwater v. Warren, 206 N.Y. 355, 99
N.E. 1042 (1912).
*1See R. H. BLANCHARD, supra note 13, at 52-53; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 29-32; J.
WEINSM , supra note 13, at 43.
22 R. H. BLANcHARS, supra note 13, at 52-53; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1,at 29-32.
23 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 30. But see WORKuMEN'S COMI'ENSATnON COMPENDIUM, supra
note 15, at 13.
24 See supra notes 1 & 3.
Is See supra note 1.
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cism. During the initial movement toward enactment of workers'
compensation statutes, numerous arguments were advanced in favor
of what was recognized as a "radical departure" from the common
law.26 Inadequacy of compensation was usually cited as the primary
reason for the introduction of workers' compensation. 27 Estimates of
the percentage of uncompensated injuries in various jurisdictions
ranged from seventy percent to ninety-four percent. 28 In addition,
advocates of the compensation system asserted that both equitable and
societal interests demanded that injured employees be adequately
compensated regardless of fault.2 9 Many held the view that the cost
of such compensation should be one of the employer's costs of doing
business. 30 As a corollary, it was believed that the incentive to reduce
costs would encourage employers to take safety precautions to protect
employees. 31 Additionally, the elimination of fault related issues was

" NATIONAL COMM'N ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 34 (1972); Smith, Sequel to Workmen's CompensationActs, 27 HARv. L. REv. 235, 245-47 (1914).
1" CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 19, at 5-9; MASSACHUSETTS COMM'N ON COMPENSATION
FoR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, REPORT 46-47 (1912) [hereinafter cited as MASSACHUSEmrs REPOr];
MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 13, at 150-52; WAINWRIGHT REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-14;
Brodie, supra note 1, at 57-58; Hannold, Theory of Workmen's Compensation,3 CORNELL L.Q.
264, 264-65 (1918); Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their
Constitutionality,25 HARv. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (1911).
U W. PRossm, supra note 16, at 530 n. 32.
U It was generally believed that a large portion of accidents were not based on anyone's
negligence. R. H. BLANCHARD, supra note 13, at 10-11 (between 52 and 89% not attributable to
negligence); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 27 (44% of industrial accidents not attributable to
negligence); MINNESOTA REPor, supra note 13, at 150 (between one-half and two-thirds of all
accidents not caused by negligence).
Concern for compensating victims of accidents not caused by negligence was a major
motivation behind the workers' compensation movement. See C. EASTMAN, supra note 19, at
208; WAINWRIGHT REPor, supra note 2, at 25-26.
30R. H. BLANCHARD, supra note 13, at 72-78; E. H. DOWNEY, supra note 2, at 14-15. "The
basic principle of the ... [Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act] is that the cost of
injuries incident to modern industry should be treated as a part of the cost of production."
MASSACHUsE-rs REPORT, supra note 27, at 46.
Workers' compensation was viewed by its advocates as a remedial device for a defect in the
common-law approach. One major justification for the common law negligence system is the
economic theory of an open market society. It was thought that wages of jobs would automatically adjust to the amount of risk involved and, therefore, with higher wages the workman could
provide insurance for himself. It was also thought that via market economics, the cost of
accidents was actually being borne by the ultimate consumer because the higher wages for high
risk jobs caused higher production costs and, therefore, higher prices. The early state commissions found that there was not, however, a significant wage differential between high and low
risk jobs and that insurance among workmen was inadequate. WAINWRICHT REPor, supra note
2, at 26-27; WomtE's COMPENSATION COmPENDIuM, supra note 15, at 21-22; Wambaugh,
supra note 27, at 129-30.
31As the Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents reported:
The law will operate to prevent injuries. No one can study the history of this
subject in other countries without being impressed by the fact that the operation of

732

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:725

a means of obviating costly and sometimes spurious litigation, as well
as saving court resources and attorneys' fees. 32 Finally, by putting an
end to wide ranging jury verdicts and instead, substituting liability
measured by lost compensation and medical expenses, business planning could be undertaken with greater certainty and insurance companies would be33in a better position to make decisions concerning risk
discrimination.

compensation laws in several of them has materially reduced the number of injuries
in factories and workshops, especially those resulting from machine operation.
In Massachusetts this subject has not received so much attention as in some
foreign countries. But under the terms of the new law, where every injury carries
with it compensation, the employers will realize that it is of the utmost consequence,
in a financial as well as a humanitarian way, to prevent the injury. It is believed that
it will be possible to decrease very largely the number of accidents, and this aspect of
the law is regarded as its most important part.
MASSAcHuSrrs REsonr, supra note 27, at 46; see E. H. DOWNE:, supra note 2, at 35; C.
EAsrmA, supra note 19, at 105-15.
32 See MAssACHusrrs RPsorr, supra note 27, at 51. The New York State Commission on

Employers' Liability (Wainwright Commission) found in a detailed survey that out of $23.53
million of premiums paid to liability insurance companies only $8.56 million was paid to
employees (36.34%). When court costs and attorneys' fees were deducted, it became clear that
only a small fraction of the money spent by employers on liability insurance went to injured
employees: It was a major purpose of compensation laws to channel more of the money spent by
employers for industrial accidents to injured employees. WAINwmeGHT REoirr, supra note 2, at
25-27.
The Minnesota Bureau of Labor stated that about 32% of the premiums collected were
actually paid to injured workers. The Bureau concluded, however, that the insurance companies
were probably not making excess profits due to heavy costs associated with the common-law
liability system. MINNESOTA REPorr, supra note 13, at 146-49. In addition, the Bureau cited to
the following account contained in its preliminary bulletin of October 1909, entitled "Industrial
Accidents and Employers' Liability":
An attorney in New York City who has handled six thousand cases in damage
suits, states that in the master and servant cases, the average compensation in these
cases either in settlements or indemnities, awarded amounted to three hundred
dollars. That makes a total of $1,800,000 which was paid, half of which went to the
working-man, the other going to the lawyers. In other words, in these six thousand
cases, there was an expenditure of nine hundred thousand dollars ($900,000) which
went to the workingm an. Now, what did it cost the State of New York in the way of
expenses, if not New York City? This same lawyer gives it as his estimate that the
courts in New York State and the judicial system in greater New York cost six million
dollars ($6,000,000) a year, and that sixty per cent (60%) of the work of that system
is represented by accident and liability cases. In other words, the State of New York
paid out thirty-six hundred thousand dollars ($36,000,000) [sic] as expenses of procedure assessed upon the public as taxes in order to get into the workingnan's hand
nine hundred thousand dollars ($900,000) worth of compensation.
Id. at 147.
It is interesting to note that according to one study, the percentage of premiums paid by
insurers to automobile accident victims under negligence laws (63%) was not significantly
different from the percentage of premiums paid to beneficiaries under no-fault, fire insurance,
and health insurance statutes. Spangenberg, No-Fault: Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J.
15, 34-35 (1973); see also infra note 92.
33 R. H. BL.ANcsHARD, supra note 13, at 63-65, 78; CONNE~rCUT REPoRT, supra note 19, at 17;
MINNESOTA REPoar, supra note 13, at 149.
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On the other hand, although ultimately supported by both the
National Association of Manufacturers and the American Federation
of Labor, early workers' compensation statutes faced notable opposi-

tion from representatives of labor who preferred to preserve common
law liability in the hopes of continued progress in eliminating employer defenses. 34 Similarly, recent plaintiff-oriented developments
in tort law have led some commentators to suggest that the "compromise" 35 struck by the shared liability of workers' compensation should
be reassessed. 36 These include developments relating to products liability, 37 comparative negligence, 38 and res ipsa loquitur;3 the rejec-

34 See J. WmNsrmN, supra note 13, at 43; see also Croyle, IndustrialAccident Liability in the
EarlierTwentieth Century, 7 J. LEGAL STo. 279 (1978); Rhodes, supra note 2. In line with this
view, support for workers' compensation has been traced to those favoring hidden subsidies to
business. Calabresi, supra note 14, at 516 (1961); see supra note 14.
35 See supra note 1.
3 E.g., N. ASHFORD, Crusts IN THE WORKPLACE-OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 386-422

(1976); Project: New York Workmen's Compensation Law: Problems and Perspectives, 26
BUFFALO L. REv. 639, 645-46, 651-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Project].
" See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963)
(manufacturer liable on theory of strict liability in tort although defendant took all possible care
in manufacture); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)
(manufacturer liable on theory of breach of implied warranty without showing of privity of
contract or negligence in manufacture). Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
(adopted in most jurisdictions) provides in pertinent part: "One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . is subject to liability for
physical harm there caused to the ultimate user or consumer ... although the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." R.ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 402A (1977). In large part, the rationale for this approach is the concept of "enterprise
liability" also used to support workers compensation. See id. § 402A comment c; Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MtNN. L. REv. 791 (1966). Nevertheless, the question of what is defective is still the subject of much litigation. Hoenig, Product
Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. (1976); Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973). "Strict products
liability does not involve as great a departure from ordinary principles of negligence as is
sometimes supposed. After all, strict liability requires the showing of a product 'defect.' In suits
against the manufacturer, a defect in the product almost always signifies the manufacturer's
negligence." Schwartz, Contributoryand ComparativeNegligence: A Reappraisal,87 YALE L.J.
697, 700 n. 17 (1978) (citing W. Paossrn, supra note 16, at 644-49, 672-76).
The legal developments in products liability have led to proposals for a no-fault system
along the lines of workers' compensation or no-fault automobile accident systems. See J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, at 141-44; Sherman, Legislative Responses to Judicial Activism in Strict
Liability: Reform or Reaction?, 44 BRooKLYN L. REv. 359 (1978). The arguments made in favor
of the no-fault proposals are reminiscent of those made in favor of workers' compensation in the
early part of this century. An important difference, however, is that today the most pressing
concern seems not to be compensation, but rather the price and availability of insurance. See
Birnbaum, supra note 7, at 253; Byington, Public Regulation of Consumer Products and
ProductsLiability-The Interface, 14 FoRUM 327 (1978); Schwartz, FederalAction on Product
Liability-What Has Occurred and What May Occur, 14 FoRUM 287, 290-91 (1978); Soloman,
The Asbestos Fallout at Johns-Manville, FORTuNE, May 7, 1979, at 1976-97. One might infer,
therefore, that the civil liability system is now paying well or perhaps "too well."
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Absent the intervening arrest of the common law development of employer liability occasioned by the enactment of workers' compensation, much of the reasoning that led courts to hold
manufacturers liable for their products after sale may have been applied in the case of employees
injured in their manufacture. Project, supra note 36, at 649.
For a recent consideration of the legal developments, the problems, and some proposals
regarding products liability, see INTEFLAGENCY TASK FoacE ON PoDucrs LiLALrrY, FNAL REPORT
(1977); Smith, Products Liability: A Compendium of Reform, 15 Hous. L. REv. 871 (1978);
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN.
L. Rhv. 713 (1970); Weisgall, Products Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Worker's
Compensation on the Rights of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1050-51.
The question of the relative performance of products liability and workers' compensation
systems is relevant also to important questions involving third party liability for accidents giving
rise to liability under both workers' compensation and products liability as well as other forms of
traditional tort liability. For example, when an employee is injured by a product in the course of
employment, should the third party, whose liability has been greatly expanded by the development of products liability and whose liability insurance costs have sharply risen or become
unavailable, be able to receive compensation under contribution or indemnity principles from
negligent employers whose liability has been limited under workers' compensation and whose
insurance costs are less in comparison? Should negligent employers be subrogated so as to collect
from negligent third party manufacturers, when under common-law principles they might,
depending on the jurisdiction, be barred from such third party assistance? Should common-law
liability of manufacturers to employees of other firms be eliminated and should those employees
be restricted to an expanded workers' compensation program with the negligent manufacturers
contributing in proportion to their degree of responsibility for the injury, or with the employer
being assigned the employee's claim against the third party as a means of financing workers'
compensation insurance? The question of liability between negligent employers and third parties
for injuries to employees is an area of law which is currently the subject of significant evolution
and controversy. It has proceeded largely in terms of statutory construction of the scope of the
exclusive remedy provisions of the various workers compensation statutes and the law of indemnity and contribution in the particular jurisdiction. It would seem, however, that legislative
reform in this area will inevitably involve, at least in part, an evaluation of the performance of
workers' compensation and traditional civil liability. For various comments and proposals, see
Bernstein, Third Party Claims in Workers' Compensation:A Proposal To Do More with Less,
1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 543; Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and HarborWorkers' Compensation Act: An Opportunityfor Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite IndustrialAccident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587, 606 (1974); Davis, Third Party Tortfeasors'
Rights-Where CompensationCovered Employees Are Negligent-Wheredo Dole and Sunspan
Lead?, 4 HoFsmA L. REv. 571 (1976); Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation
and the IndustrialAccident, 14 DuQ. L. R-v. 349, 396-97 (1976); O'Connell, FinancingFirstParty No-Fault Insurance by Assignment of Third Party Tort Claims, 1978 INS. L.J. 207;
[hereinafter cited as O'Connell, FinancingFirst PartyNo-Fault]; O'Connell, Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees but Not Employers, 1977 LAB. L.J. 287 [hereinafter cited
as O'Connell, Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy]; O'Connell, Transferring Injured
Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New "Sole Remedy" Approaches To Cure Liability
InsuranceIlls, 1977 U. 1I. L.F. 749 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, "Sole Remedy']; Comment, The Effect of Workers' CompensationLaws on the Right of a Third Party Liable to an
Injured Employee To Recover Contributionor rndemnityfrom the Employee, 9 SErON HALL L.
REv. 238, 300-02 (1978).
3 Over the last decade, the doctrine of comparative negligence has gained a significant
increase in popularity. In 1971, only seven states applied the doctrine. Today, at least thirty-two
states apply comparative negligence in one of two forms: "pure," where plaintiff's recovery is
reduced by the ratio of his negligence to the sum of his and the defendant's negligence; or
"modified," which also provides for proportionate recovery but denies recovery where the
plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than one-half of the total negligence. Schwartz, supra
note 37; Comment, The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act: The Fifty-One Percent
Solution, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 356-58 (1977).
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tion of custom as controlling in determining standards of care; 40 and
4
the increase in jury awards. '
In 1972, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws found that workers' compensation plans "are in general
neither adequate nor just in terms of five objectives of a modern
workers' compensation program.14 2 The five objectives listed were:

(1) "broad coverage of employees and work-related injuries and diseases;" (2) "substantial protection against interruption of income;" (3)
"provision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services;" (4)
"encouragement of safety;" and (5) "an effective system for delivery of

the benefits and services."

43

The Commission rejected such alternatives as a return to civil
damage actions 44 or absorption of workers' compensation by social
security,4 5 and instead recommended as "essential elements" of work-

ers' compensation 46 virtually universal employee coverage, 47 increased
The development of comparative negligence may have an impact upon the area of products
liability. Although most states follow section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts in denying
as a defense inadvertent contributory negligence, the allowance of comparative negligence to
decrease a products liability award may be regarded more favorably. See Schwartz, supra note
37, at 698; Note, supra note 1, at 257.
"I See Jaffee, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALo L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1951).
10 See W. PROssER, supra note 16, at 166-68.
11 See CoMMISsIoN RPorrr, supra note 1, at 119; R. RABIN, PEBsPEC-rvEs ON Tor LAW 1-3,
61-63, 96-98, 139-43, 211-13 (1976); Franklin, supra note 9, at 786; Note, supra note 1, at 251;
Project, supra note 36, at 652.
01 COMMIssION REIoar-, supra note 1, at 119.
43 Id. at 15, 35.
44 In rejecting the return to civil damages, the Commission reasoned:
One possible alternative is to rely on negligence suits. From the worker's standpoint,
this option may be somewhat more attractive than it was 50 years ago, when
workmen's compensation was first widely adopted, because the plaintiff's burden
subsequently has been eased in negligence suits. Other reasons, however, have
convinced us that, for workers and others, workmen's compensation is preferable to
negligence actions. For example, the issue of negligence is particularly elusive in the
work setting. Most studies of work-related impairments stress the intermingling of
employee and employer responsibility in a substantial proportion of accidents. The
determination of negligence tends to be expensive and the outcome uncertain.
Payments tend to be delayed when negligence suits are prosecuted, and overcrowded
court dockets would compound the delays. Some workers eventually would receive
damage awards in excess of workmen's compensation benefits, but others would
receive no protection. Moreover, even when the worker succeeded in winning
monetary damages, the litigation could be a substantial deterrent to successful
rehabilitation.
We conclude that damage suits are a distinctly inferior alternative to workmen's
compensation.
Id. at 119-20.
45 Id. at 119-21.
46 Id. at 26.
47 Id. at 26, 4548.
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maximum benefits, 48 more coverage for occupational disease, 49 and
continuation of payments during disability for life. 50 The Commis-

sion estimated that implementing the essential elements of reform
would increase costs by approximately two percent to sixty-two percent but that the reforms could be met in forty-six of the fifty-one
jurisdictions by less than a fifty percent increase in workers' compen5
sation costs. '

Response to the Commission report has been in the form of
recommended modifications in workers' compensation benefits rather
than suggestions for change in the basic structure. 52 While conceding
inadequacies and inequities in workers' compensation, many advocates of no-fault systems point to workers' compensation as an example of the superiority of the no-fault liability approach as compared to
5 3
negligence.

III.

REPARATION SYSTEMS

To evaluate the operation of tort and no-fault systems, it is

essential to understand that each is part of a network of public and
private institutions that can be termed "reparation systems."

54

These

systems serve to compensate injured victims, either as such or as
members of other groups of beneficiaries eligible for compensation by
reason of disability, age, need, employment contract or practice, or
insurance contract.
Reparations systems in the United States may be grouped into

four general categories: (1) "legal liability systems" (e.g., tort, work48 Id. at 26, 60-64, 71.

19 Id. at 26, 50.
woId. at 16, 65, 72.
51 Id. at 143-46.
52 See, e.g., Benson, Impact of Proposed National Workmen's Compensation Acts on Ohio
Workmen's Compensation, 4 OHio N.U.L. REv. 269 (1977); Brainerd, 1977 Workmen's Compensation Legislation, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 471, 476-82 (1978); Wright & Rankin, Potential
Federalizationof State Workmen's Compensation Laws: The Kansas Response, 15 WASHBURN
L.J. 244 (1976); Comment, Proposed FederalWorkmen's Compensation Legislation:A Comparative View, 6 CASE W. Rms. J. INT'L L. 121 (1973); Comment, Amendments to the Alabama
Workmen's Compensation Law, 7 CUM. L. REV. 123 (1976); Note, The Changing Face of
Illinois Workmen's Compensation: In Search of a Workable Response to FederalGuidelines, 8
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 543 (1977); Comment, Workmen's Compensation: National Commission on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws: Import for Oklahoma, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 446 (1973).
53 See, e.g., Chelius, Comparison,supra note 12; Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Extend to Non-Occupational Injuries?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 117, 129-57 (1969); O'Connell,
FinancingFirst-PartyNo-Fault,supra note 37; Soble, A Proposalfor Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution:A Model Act, 14 HA'v. J. oN LEcIs. 683, 718-20

(1977).
"

CoNA

As a useful organizing concept, we adopt Conard's idea of "reparations systems." See A.
, supra note 1, at 75-107.
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ers' compensation, and no-fault automobile accident systems); (2)
"social insurance" which is funded by compulsory payments made by
the "insured" parties; (3) "uninsured public programs" such as welfare
and veterans' benefits funded by tax revenues; and (4) private "voluntary loss or disability insurance" systems such as life, health, accident
or disability insurance, and uninsured formal and informal "sick
leave" programs. 55
For purposes of providing some background, this section of the
article will briefly define the competing "legal liability systems" mentioned above and describe their general objectives in order to establish
a basis for later comparing these "liability systems" in terms of how
well they achieve those objectives.
A. The Tort System
Within the context of this paper, the tort system 8 refers to the
body of law governing accidental injury but excluding no-fault systems as described below. It includes instances of "strict liability" that
have developed through judicial decisions, such as in cases of ultrahazardous activity and manufacturing. It also includes the residual
common law governing employers' liability to employees where workers' compensation legislation has not totally eliminated it. It is thus the
broad, somewhat amorphous, evolutionary system generally understood as the common law of tort, where fault plays a significant
(though in the case of strict liability, a diminished) role in establishing
judicial determinations of liability for economic losses and pain and
suffering without imposing maximum limits on, or exclusions from,
recovery.57 It is administered in our courts, governed by traditional
rules of evidence and championed by attorneys, typically for contingent fees ranging from twenty-five percent to forty percent, but most
often thirty-three and one-third percent, of the recovery.58 In addition, by virtue of the collateral source rule, 59 payments for losses made
" We have somewhat departed from Conard's categories for the sake of simplicity.
Cf. Franklin, supra note 9, at 778. See generally W. PRossER, supra note 16, at 139-525.
, See generally W. Plosssn, supra note 16, at 139-525.
O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE RDMEDY OF No-FAuLT INSURANCE 37-53

58j.

(1971); see infra note 79.
' See Maxwell, The CollateralSource Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L.
Rtv. 669-95 (1962); Moceri & Messina, The CollateralSource Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation,
7 GCoNz. L. REv. 310, 319 (1972). The rule is stated as follows: Benefits received by the plaintiff
from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the

damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer. 22 AM. Jun.

2D

Damages § 206 (1965).

The rule has been criticized, e.g., Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral
Source Rule, 77 HAv. L. REv. 741-53 (1964), but it is recognized in all jurisdictions except
Alabama. J. STIN, DAMACES AND REcovER,

PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS 288 (1972).
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to victims by other sources do not diminish the liability of the tortfeasor. 60
B. No-Fault Liability
No-fault systems 6' (including workers' compensation) are those
which allocate, without regard to fault, the costs of a defined set of
accidents to a defined set of parties having a relationship to the
accident. To the extent they apply, no-fault systems eliminate tort
liability. Parties liable (e.g., drivers, employers) may be required to
purchase insurance providing compensation to victims or to qualify as
self-insurers. The insurance premiums are adjusted according to risk.
Recovery may be limited to only a percentage of actual losses (or an
absolute maximum) and there may be no recovery for pain and suffering. Simpler, less adversarial procedures for determining liability are
substituted for the rigors of litigation. Payments from collateral
62
sources are frequently applied to reduce the no-fault liability.
Workers' Compensation
As used in this article, workers' compensation refers to a typical
workers' compensation program. 63 In reality, these programs differ
among states as to such features as their elective or compulsory character, the industries covered, and the limits on recovery of loss. Typically, workers' compensation programs eliminate employers' common
law liability for employment-related injuries as well as the common
law defenses to recovery. Instead, they provide for "certain" employee
recovery, without regard to fault, in the amount of one hundred
percent of medical expenses and from fifty percent to (and increasingly) sixty-six and two-thirds percent of pre-injury wage income, but
no recovery for pain and suffering. There are frequently ceilings on
the maximum income loss recovery and limitations on the period of
time for which an injured employee may recover even though the
income loss and need may continue. The system is usually adminis-

Against a solid majority, a few cases hold that insurance proceeds paid under employer financed
policies are not from a collateral source and may be considered to reduce employer liability. Id.
at 306-11.
60See infra notes 150 & 151 and accompanying text.
61 There is no single definition of no-fault systems. Such systems are variously described,
defined, and proposed for different purposes. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 3-15; J.
O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 10; J. O'CONNELL, INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT
INSURANCE 114-116 (1971); Blum & Kalven, supra note 5: Keeton, supra note 10, at 8-12.
42 See infra notes 150 & 151 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 1.
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tered by a government agency which conducts proceedings where
rules of evidence, procedure, and choice of law are relaxed and the
adversary nature of the process is minimized to the extent possible.
Employers are required either to purchase insurance or to qualify as
self-insurers. The right to sue third parties survives, and insurers and
employers who have made payments under the program are reimbursed from, and frequently have the right to control, third-party
litigation.64
C. Objectives
Liability systems, as with all reparation systems, are enacted to
achieve four principal purposes. 65 First, the systems are aimed at
providing compensation to the individual who has suffered a loss.
Second, reparation systems attempt to allocate the costs of injury. In
this respect, liability systems are distinguishable from other reparation
systems because of their special emphasis on deterrence. Liability
systems are used to allocate costs among those parties responsible for
the hardship so as to deter future accidents and promote safety,
whereas this deterrence objective is not a primary allocational principle in other reparation systems. Third, reparation systems are intended to promote efficiency in providing compensation to the victim.
Finally, these systems are utilized to satisfy the popular sense of
66
equity.
The objective of providing adequate compensation relates to how
fully compensation payments cover losses. Thus, the extent to which a
reparations system provides "adequate" compensation for accidental
injury or death can be measured by comparing compensation payments to the losses that, absent compensation, are borne by the victim. 6 7
Cost allocation, the second objective of reparation systems, refers
to the method in which both the direct and indirect costs of accidental
injury are distributed among parties involved with the injury. One
objective of cost allocation, emphasized most in connection with lia-

" For various descriptions of significant common features of workers' compensation systems,
see 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 1-2; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMPENDIUM, supra note 15,
at 29-40.
6' See A. CONARD, supra note 1, at 75-107; cf. C. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 29.

As has been noted, goals of reparation systems are not always fully consistent; frequently,
one cannot improve output of one goal without sacrificing output of another goal. N. Ast'oRD,
supra note 36, at 389-93, 407-10; see C. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 29.

"Compensation" consists of the payment of the direct costs of accidents which are incurred
by the victims. See infra notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 12:725

bility systems, is to encourage safety and deter accidents by imposing
cost burdens on those who can reasonably be expected to avoid such
6
liability in the future.
Direct costs arising from an accidental injury or death include:
(1) wage losses suffered by the victim; (2) medical care and rehabilitation costs of the victim; (3) pain and suffering imposed on the victim
and on persons closely related to the victim; (4) damages to physical
capital (e.g., auto damages, damages to production machinery, inventory, etc.); (5) losses of output due to the reduction of productivity
of persons other than the victim; and (6) administrative costs of the
6
reparation system involved .
The indirect costs of accidents include welfare losses and the costs
of prevention. Welfare losses are incurred if the utility of persons not
directly involved in the accident is reduced in consequence of the
accident. If, for example, the treatment afforded victims offends others in society the welfare of the nonvictims is thereby reduced and this
loss becomes a social cost of accidents. 70 The costs of prevention are
comprised of expenditures made to prevent accidents. These expenditures also constitute indirect accident costs because in a less risky
environment these resources could be employed to produce other
goods and services.
The third goal of reparations systems is to provide the most
efficient method for determining losses and awarding appropriate
compensation. In the fault/no-fault debate the distinction between
administrative costs and administrative efficiency is often blurred.
Administrative costs and administrative efficiency refer to different
system characteristics. One cannot meaningfully compare administrative efficiency without considering the comparative administrative
costs relative to the differing outputs of each system. Cost differences
may or may not be desirable depending upon how the different outputs are valued. A comparison of the administrative costs of workers'
compensation, for example, to the tort system it replaced is a measure
of the relative efficiency of the two systems only if the results produced by the two systems are identical, and yet the systems are
designed to produce different results. Thus, in comparing the administrative efficiency of the two systems by reference to administrative
costs, it is necessary simultaneously to relate the differences in those

0 G. CALAnomi, supra note 10, at 68-94; A. CONAI=D, supra note 1, at 88-92; see supra note

61.

"0See G.
See G.

70

CA.Aansi,
CALARESI,

supra note 10; A. CoNM , supra note 1, at 137-45.
supra note 10, at 28.
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costs to the differences in compensation, incentives for safety, and
equity which are effected by the two systems.
From a practical standpoint, the administrative costs associated
with the tort system include court fees, attorney and expert fees, and
collection costs. 7' Other administrative costs can include the costs of
settling cases out of court and the costs of determining which cases are
without merit.
Although not inconsiderable litigation still ensues on questions of
coverage, no-fault systems seek to avoid most of these costs by replacing the common-law adversary process with administrative processes. 2 Most particularly, they seek to eliminate attorneys' fees,
viewed as by far the single greatest component of the administrative
costs of the tort system. 73 Additionally, no-fault systems attempt to
replace judges and courtrooms (thereby freeing them to ease other
backlogs) for lower-cost, specialized, agency personnel and facilities. 74
Many advocates of no-fault systems implicitly conclude that these
reductions in administrative costs are passed on to victims as increased
compensation compared to that under the tort approach.7 5 This is
not necessarily true, but it is one of the issues that should be empirically tested.
Reaching an equitable result from the point of view of all parties
involved is the fourth objective of reparations systems and is a question which permeates every decision made under the law. While the
importance of principles of justice and equity is without question, we
wish to note that these principles are not, at least within the scope of
this article, susceptible to empirical evaluation. It is our hope, however, that the conceptual framework and empirical analysis set forth
in this article will be helpful in making just decisions in evaluating
competing liability systems.
IV. THE

EVALUATION AND COMPARISON

OF COMPETING LIABILITY SYSTEMS

In evaluating the competing liability systems three principles
should be remembered:

1. The evaluation of the relative merits of liability systems depends upon the viewpoint of the evaluator. The optimum system,
71 Essentially, then, we include within administrative costs the costs of determining the rate

and extent of liability and the cost of enforcing the liability imposed or agreed upon.
71 See supra notes 1 & 10 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 9, 10 & 32 and accompanying text.
7' See supra notes I & 6-10 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 32.
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viewed by the society as a whole, may be less attractive to a private
party. In general, individuals are interested in minimizing their
own costs, and only society has a primary interest in minimizing
overall costs.
2. The systems do not operate in vacuo, but are superimposed on
an existing network of reparations programs. 7 6 As such, the compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and equity goals of these programs sometimes conflict.
3. Different elements of administrative costs must be analyzed
in terms of how they qualitatively and quantitatively affect the
objectives of compensation, safety incentives, and equity.
With these principles in mind, we will now compare the operation of workers' compensation and tort law from both a theoretical
and an empirical approach.
A. Theoretical Analysis
The extent to which competing reparation systems serve the interdependent, and sometimes conflicting objectives of compensation,
deterrence, economy, and justice, may differ considerably in theory
and in practice. The purpose of this section is to analyze in theory the
expected results of workers' compensation and the traditional negligence system.
If one assumes that deterrence, efficiency, and equity objectives
are equally satisfied under each system, then from society's viewpoint
the preferable system is the one that most adequately compensates
victims. In evaluating the competing systems, society will first want to
know the expected aggregate amount of loss of all types left uncompensated. Further, it might want to know how the distribution of
uncompensated loss is related to the nature, severity, and probability
of injury, the class of victims, and various social purposes.77
Unfortunately, our empirical evidence sheds light only on expected recovery, with some differentiation in terms of severity of
injury, and we have structured our equations accordingly. Neverthe76 The operation of reparations systems should also be analyzed in the context of other
systems of deterrence. Negligence and workers' compensation systems have been called systems of
general deterrence. In contrast, "specific" deterrence systems provide penalties, in the form of
fines and imprisonment, for injury-related violations of care and other prescribed duties. See G.
CALABrsSI, supra note 10, at 95-129. As with compensation from other sources, the existence and
enforcement of specific deterrence must be considered in assessing the desired mix of system
goals. We do not, however, have any data on the specific deterrence issue- and apart from this
reference for the sake of completeness, we shall not consider specific deterrence.
7 N. ASHFORD, supra note 36, at 391, 406, 411-16; COMMISSION RzEPomr, supra note 1. at 35.
Compare Keeton, supra note 10, at 1-3 with G. CALABeESI, supra note 10, at 31-33, 39-67 and
W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUnBuc LAW PEaSPEcrIVES ON A PRIvATE LAW PROBLEM 471-72 (1965).
See generally Blum & Kalven, supra note 5.
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less, we submit that data on expected recovery is important for at least
four reasons. First, the expected recovery is a measure of the compensation available under the particular system for the entire class of

victims. Next, a portion of the uncompensated losses falling upon
welfare-eligible persons will be financed by general tax revenues.
Third, a portion of uncompensated losses will be borne by relatives
and friends of the victim-individuals who are unconnected with the

accident. Finally, some uncompensated losses may be assumed by
charities, thus depleting resources which could be used for other
charitable assistance.
Assuming for the moment that the risk of injury is exogenous to

the mode of reparations, the potential victim's choice between nofault liability (or workers' compensation) and negligence can be repre-

sented as the difference between the expected benefits available
through each system in the event of an accident. From the potential
victim's viewpoint, the best system is the one that results in the
78
greatest expected net compensation.
The recoveries under each system may be analyzed by employing
symbolic equations. Given the following definitions and assumptions:
N = Negligence approach;
S = No-fault approach;

B = Compensation benefits received by victim if injured;
r = Probability of recovering economic losses (, assumed to
1);
r'= Probability of compensation for pain and suffering (7r, assumed to = 0);
K = Maximum percentage of economic loss that victim is permitted to recover;
E = Probability factor;
T = Transaction costs borne by victim (T, assumed to = 0);
WL = Wage Loss;
Med = Medical Costs;
79
PS = Pain and suffering;
7' This proposition assumes that the victim attaches no differential value to uncertainty or

risk of recovery. There is a substantial body of commentary which discusses and debates the
extent to which individuals attach differential value to the risk or uncertainty of receiving an
expected level of benefits. Some individuals may prefer a low-risk, low-yield expectancy while
others will prefer a high-risk chance at greater recovery, though both alternatives may have the
same expected value. For example, a 50% chance of receiving $400 creates the same expected
value as a 100% chance of receiving $200.
In this article, for simplicity, we frequently compare expected values as though victims and
society were risk neutral. We do not mean, however, to make judgments on questions of
individual risk preference; rather, our purpose is to provide some information that would be
important to people who are concerned about risk and distribution of benefits.
79 Our assumptions (w, = 1, Ts = 0, 0 < Ks < 1) are those frequently adopted for simplicity in
discussions of the no-fault approach. We assume that every victim is compensated for some
fraction of his economic loss; that his costs of recovery are zero and that no compensation is
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then the expected recovery under a tort system would be represented
by the following equation:
(1) E(B)N

=

7rN

(WL + MED) + 7r,. (PS) -

TN

Expected recovery under a no-fault system (where we have assumed
7r' = 0 and T, = 0) would be:
(2) E(B)s = rsK (WL + MED) + 0 - 0

The difference in expected benefits between negligence and no-fault
then is:
(3) E(BN - Bs) = 7rN (WL + MED) - 7r.K. (WL + MED)
+ ?r,. (PS) - TN

If we adopt the simplifying assumption that the transaction costs
in negligence suits can be represented by attorneys' contingency fees,
then:
(4)

TN

=

(1 - KN)

(TrN)

(WL + MED) + (1 - KN) (rN (PS))

where KN is equivalent to the proportion of benefits to be paid to the
victim. If attorney fees are taken into account, then the difference in
net compensation to the victim between tort and no-fault systems
would be:
(5) E(BN - B,) = (7rNKN - TrsKs) (WL + MED) + TrKN (PS)
These equations focus attention on the fact that, in evaluating the
two approaches, the no-fault limit on recovery is, from the victim's
viewpoint, a deduction from his recovery just as the attorney's fee is in
a negligence suit.8A If the two proportions of recovery are equal (i.e.,
Ks = KN), then potential victims need not consider transaction costs in
their evaluation of the two alternatives. Instead, as described below,
they would compare the probabilities of recovery under each system
and the expected compensation for pain and suffering under negligence. The comparisons may be facilitated by additional assumptions
related to Ks and KN. First, it should be noted that according to the
foregoing equations, we have assumed a "composite" K operating to
limit the victim's recovery to a composite percentage of total losses
comprised of the separate components of lost wages and medical costs.
In negligence cases, if we assume a typical attorney's fee of thirtythree and one-third percent,8 ' which operates to limit the victim's
provided for pain and suffering. Chelius, Comparison, supra note 12, at 301; Franklin, supra
note 9, at 794; Keeton, supra note 10, at 45; O'Connell, "Sole Remedy", supra note 37, at 750-

51.

'0Blum

& Kalven, supra note 5, at 396-99.

a' UNITED STATES DEPARM
oF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUToMoBILE AcamENr INJURS 49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION].
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recovery both as to wage losses and medical losses, then the limitations
on recovery for wage losses (KN(,,.) and the limitations on recovery for
medical losses (KN(,E)) are equal. Thus, under our present assump-

tions, KN( = KNNED) = KN = .67. However, for our strict liability
alternative if we assume the "ideal" recovery limit under workers'
compensation of sixty-seven percent of wage loss and one8 hundred
1; 2 and the
percent of medical costs, then Ks,L) = .67 and K,(ED)
composite Ks will equal the weighted average of .67 and 1, depending
on the magnitude of the separate losses related to wages and medical
costs.
Recalling that we have assumed 7r= 1, we can now rearrange
equation 5 and incorporate our additional assumptions as follows:
(6) E(BN- Bs) [(irN)(KN) - 7rs(Ks0wL))] (WL) + [(7rN)(KN) - rs
(KsED))] (MED) + 7r'(KN)(PS)
(7)
= [(r)(.67) 1(.67)] (WL) + [(7rQ)(.67)-1(1)]
(MED) .+ 7rN'(KN)(PS)
For our hypothetical worker, the choice between being covered
by workers' compensation or the negligence system is determined by
the extent to which the (presumably) lower expected recovery for
wage loss and medical costs under negligence (taking into account the
probability factor) is offset by the expected recovery under tort for
pain and suffering.
This example is purposely simplistic. It ignores several facts: (1)
that there are legal fees and other transaction costs to some victims
under workers' compensation; 83 (2) that the average compensation for
wage loss is less than sixty-six and two-thirds percent even in states
where the ideal has been adopted as the maximum (i.e., irs(WL) <
.67);84 (3) that all injured workers, even in cases where an application
for workers' compensation is made, do not receive workers' compensation benefits (i.e., 7r, < 1);85 (4) that some workers' compensation
claimants who receive benefits do not recover one hundred percent of

"' CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ANALYSIS OF WORK

' COMPENSATION

19-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CHAMBER OF COMMERCE].
3 Controverted claims often involve attorneys for both the employer and the employee.
Many cases also involve the costs of appeal. See supra note I.
s1 Although the maximum allowable compensation for lost income is 662 percent for almost
every state, workers with few or no dependents and workers' survivors receive less than 662/3 % in
a great number of states. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 81, at 18-23; WORKMEN's
COMPENSATION COMPENDIuM, supra note 15, at 32.
'3 Questions of whether a particular employee or a particular injury is covered by a workers'
compensation law and whether the employee can, therefore, receive any compensation still exist
and are often resolved against the employee. See generally CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note
81, at 3-17; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMPENDIUM, supra note 15, at 29-31.
LAWS
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their medical expenses; (5) that, under negligence, attorneys' fees may
exceed thirty-three and one-third percent of the award; 86 (6) that
liability insurance may be purchased. 87 Further, the equations assume that victims are neutral in their preference as to differential
risk88 and delay 9 in the receipt of payments. Apart from questions of
risk preference, on which we have no data, we believe that the net
bias of our assumed facts tends to overstate the compensation provided
by workers' compensation as compared to negligence. 09

Safety Objectives
In evaluating the deterrent effects of cost allocations it is generally assumed that the potential risk avoider will invest in prevention

up to the point where marginal costs and benefits are equal. 9 ' Proponents of negligence systems argue that by imposing liability in terms of
fault, the most efficient risk prevention will be promoted.92
sO DE ArMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 82, at 49.
s But see infra note 95.
See supra note 78.
s' The expected benefits in the equations are expressed in terms of present value, but such
present valuation assumes a standard market rate rather than a rate which may apply to persons
with varying degrees of immediate need for compensation.
90 The effect of the bias inherent in our assumptions, together with additional biases implicit
in our comparative data, is discussed more fully in the Summary and Conclusion infra.
9' See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-10 (1972); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a
Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057-59 (1972); Croyle, supra note 341
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Li.L STUD. 151 (1973); Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
9 ComparePosner, supra note 91 with Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 91 and Schwartz,
supra note 37. See generally Posner, supra note 14.
Not considered in the foregoing discussion or elsewhere in the article is the question of
insurance. It is often argued that the availability of liability insurance frustrates the accident
deterrence function of reparations systems. It is argued that with insurance, the cost of an
accident allocated to the party causing the injury does not represent the victim's losses. Rather,
the cost is only equivalent to the present value of any premium increase. Additionally, the
contention is made that insurers are poor risk discriminators and, thus, the premium differential
between low risk and high risk injureds does not reflect the difference in the expected costs of
their actions. R. POSNER, supra note 91, at 154; NEW YORK COMM'N, SECOND REPO'r, supra note
12, at 15; Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-92 (1977). It is also argued that, premiums are such
a low proportion of total cost that they provide insubstantial economic incentives to safety
promotion. N. ASHFORD, supra note 36, at 397, 402-07, 417; WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION COMPENDIUM, supra note 15, at 289; Blum & Kalven, supra note 5; Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in
Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals,Techniques and Limits, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
493, 494-95 (1950).
Insurance may dilute the deterrent effect of negligence-based compensation; but liability
insurance is also available, and in fact a requirement, under most no-fault liability systems.
Although we cannot empirically test these questions, to compare the dilutionary impact of
insurance on the deterrence objectives of tort and no-fault systems, several critical questions
would have to be answered: (1) to what extent is insurance purchased as a means of coverage; (2)
how accurately do the insurance rates reflect actual risk of loss and liability; (3) who bears the
costs of uninsured losses?
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The economic principles noted here are frequently described in
connection with the formulation of "negligence" by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 9 3 On the strength of
this formulation, some commentators have taken all negligence law to

be founded in economic principles of efficiency and social utility.
Thus, for example, Richard Posner has suggested that rather than
compensation: "the dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability which, if followed, will bring about an efficient
4

level of accidents and safety.

9

There is, however, some reason to believe that notwithstanding
the efficiency considerations of the negligence system, optimum deter-

rence may be better achieved by imposing relatively greater costs on
nonvictims and relatively lower costs on victims. In this regard, it is
important to distinguish between negligence which causes self-injury
and negligence which causes injury to others. Commentators have
persuasively argued that the fear of pain and suffering is the primary

In each instance, it may be argued that the dilutionary impact of insurance on deterrence
will be less under negligence than under no-fault systems structured along the lines of workers'
compensation. It is generally recognized that liability insurance is more frequently required
under workers' compensation systems than under negligence systems. Consequently, such insurance is more frequently purchased by parties facing potential workers' compensation liability
than those facing possible tort liability. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 5.
Furthermore, the ceilings and limitations on workers' compensation recovery should occasion a reduction in rates for workers' compensation coverage due to the more limited and
predictable potential liability. The result is that the insurance premiums paid to cover workers'
compensation liability do not reflect the costs of losses which exceed the recovery limitations and
are borne by the injured employees. In contrast, under the tort system, where there are no such
limitations on recovery, insurance rates are set to reflect the full range of anticipated losses for
comparable accidents. As such, the rates under negligence will presumably be either higher than
the comparable rates for workers' compensation coverage, or (by reason of "uninsurable" risks)
such rates may not be offered at all. Thus, where available under the negligence system,
insurance premiums would seem to reflect more accurately the total risks of injury.
Finally, under workers' compensation the worker bears the costs of uninsured losses above
the statutory limitations; whereas under negligence, it is the negligent party who bears the cost
of uninsured losses. Thus, to the extent that insurance has a dilutionary impact on the deterrence
objective, its dilutionary effect would seem to be greater under workers' compensation than
under negligence.
91 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In this landmark case, Judge Learned Hand discussed the
duty "to provide against resulting injuries" as "a function of three variables": (1) the "probability" that a dangerous condition will be created; (2) the "gravity" of the potential injury should
the dangerous condition exist; and (3) the "burden" imposed by taking "adequate precautions" to
avoid the dangerous condition and possible injury. Judge Hand then translated his analysis into
"algebraic terms": "if the probability be called, P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied P,i.e. whether B < PL." Id. at 173.
11Posner, supra note 14, at 33. After all "cost-justified" safety alternatives have been
employed, the party liable will either pass the cost to others or absorb it. In the case of employer
liability, any losses not avoidable by cost-justified safety alternatives will be reflected in prices.
Thus, consumers are given the choice of financing the reparations or purchasing other goods or
services. Id.
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deterrent to self-injury negligence, and that beyond this strong, instinctive deterrent, cost-based deterrence is not substantial.93 In
other words, as compared with an individual's own fear of pain and
suffering, the prospect of economic loss experienced by that individual
as a result of the injury is insignificant or, at least, appreciably less
significant. Cost incentives, therefore, might have greater effect if
incremental costs are allocated to one or more nonvictims. Given the
imprecision inherent in determining negligence and the appropriate
level of economic incentives to promote safety, the foregoing distinction suggests that the preferable system, in terms of promoting safety,
is the one which provides (or errs, if at all, by providing) greater
incentives for cost-based deterrence to nonvictims who, as a result of
their activities or financial relationship, are sufficiently related to the
accident as to be able to initiate or promote safety measures.
In the context of workers' compensation, this preference for
greater cost allocation to the nonvictim may be even more persuasive.
Proponents of increased cost allocation to employers under principles
of workers' compensation argue that the employer is in a position not
only to avoid risks where his own negligence is involved, but also to
influence the conduct of other potential risk avoiders. (e.g., employees
and products manufacturers) Therefore, the increased employer incentives under workers' compensation rules may have a greater effect
than cost allocation under negligence principles.96
Administrative Efficiency
In theory, the workers' compensation model is structured more
cheaply than negligence systems because it reduces the costs of determining fault and damages. 97 Although the empirical resolution of
this question is not within the scope of this paper, we would like to
discuss briefly the criteria for such an evaluation in the hope of
reducing some of the confusion surrounding the efficiency concept in
the fault/no-fault debate.
It is important to recognize that the unqualified comparison of
relative costs implies that the alternatives considered produce the
same results-namely, some combination of compensation, deterrence, and equity. As previously noted, however, the systems are
Qs

See E. H. DowNEY, supra note 2, at 36-37; C. EAsTMA.N, supra note 12, at 216-17. But see

J. CHi-s, WOMPLACE SArTY AND HEALTH 56-57 (1977).
9a See WoRKmEN's COMPENSATION COMPNDIUM, supra note 15, at 24; supra note 31.

91 As previously noted, however, whether these costs correspond to greater efficiency depends on the outputs of the two systems and on how one values those outputs if they are
different.
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designed to produce different results. Many commentators support the
notion that the negligence approach provides inadequate compensation and incurs higher costs than no-fault plans. It is argued, therefore, that the higher administrative costs can best be justified by a
demonstration that such costs help provide more efficient accident
deterrence. 8
In comparing negligence with no-fault, we believe that these
conclusions should be reconsidered. As previously noted, the inadequacy of compensation argument is generally limited to discussions of
the performance of negligence systems alone and is not supported by
its proponents with any comparative empirical data on the operation
of the competing systems. Moreover, the expected reduction in costs
due to the elimination of attorneys' fees is rarely compared to any
estimate of increases in administrative costs attributable to growing
bureaucracies.
In evaluating the competing systems, one might also conclude
that attorneys' fees in negligence cases are "expensive" by looking at
the relation of fees to awards. °9 One of the outputs of the negligence
process is the determination of fault. Attorneys' fees, therefore, must
be considered in relation to both successful and unsuccessful claims.
To the extent that certain claimants are justifiably denied compensation under negligence rules, such findings are a beneficial output of
the system inasmuch as recovery is intended to be limited to those
truly deserving. In other words, compensation awards do not represent the total output of the negligence system from society's viewpoint
and the comparison of costs to awards understates the true efficiency
of the system by ignoring a valued output that the system has produced.
One should not infer from this discussion that we have decided
that negligence is the more efficient approach. Our objective is merely
to suggest that the issue is not so completely resolved as many suggest.
B. EmpiricalAnalysis
As previously noted, the debate over tort and no-fault systems
generally has not focused on any consideration of comparative empirical data on the operation of the two liability systems. 100 In this
section, we compare information from three sources to evaluate benefit adequacy, deterrence, and transaction costs under the alternative
systems.
0 R. POSNEM, supra note 91, at 152-54.
See, e.g., WAINWIGHT REPorr, supra note 2, at 29.
'o See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Data from a 1976 Survey of Workers' Compensation Clients,
based on a five state sample of seriously injured workers (all of whom
received a workers' compensation award) is used as a measure for the
distribution and magnitude of wage losses and the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits. Recovery ratios and transaction costs obtained from a 1969 study of compensation to automobile accident
victims are used as proxies for what injured workers might expect to
receive under a contemporary negligence approach to occupational
injury. The measure of compensation reflected in the two samples is
also analyzed in terms of severity of injury by matching data sets from
specific categories of losses. Reference is also made to fragmentary
information on recoveries for occupational injuries prior to the introduction of workers' compensation plans. By reason of limitations in
our data, our evaluation of benefit adequacy does not compare recovery for medical costs but is restricted to wage loss recovery.
The results are not, in any sense, a complete test of the relative
merits of no-fault and tort liability systems. They do, however, demonstrate that conventional wisdom and traditional assumptions regarding no-fault and negligence systems should be reconsidered, and
would be enhanced by more focus on empirical analysis.
The Health Studies Survey of Workers' Compensation (1976)
TABLE 1
A COMPARISON OF THE ADEQUACY OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BENEFITS WITH NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS
INJURED WORKERS 1976
1.

2.

WAGE
LOSS

AVERAGE
ANNUAL
WAGE
LOSS

WORK.
COMP.
BENEFITS

EMPGRP A
EMPGRP B
EMPGRP C

$3,111,048
2,278,182
1,824,111

$3,899
9,261
9,550

$211,523
152,470
269,185

TOTAL

$7,213,341

$5,841

$633,178

SOURCE-

3.

4.

5.

NEGLIGENCE

6.

7.

HYPOTHETICAL
AWARDS
6%
STANDARD

HYPOTHETICAL
AWARDS
30%
STANDARD

.07
10

$186,663
136,691
109,447

$ 933,314
683,455
547,233

798
246
191

.09

$432,801

$2,164.002

1,235

K.
(, K,)

N

SYRACUSE UNIvEssry-THE HEALTH STUDIES PROCRAM, WAGE LOSSES AND WORKES' COMPENSATION
BzNEFrrs-THE SuavEY OF Woaxs" COMPENSATION R PIPENTS (1976).
Hypothetical Awards calculated by applying recovery ratios (6 %-30 %) for occupational injuries cited

in W. PRoSSER,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

To=rs 530 n. 32 (4th ed. 1971).

The Health Studies Survey was conducted by the Health Studies
Program of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, under the auspi-
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ces of the Federal Interdepartmental Task Force on Workers' Compensation. The Survey collected data on a wide range of worker
characteristics and experiences. 01 For the purposes of this article, we
confine our discussion to the collected data on wages, wage losses, and
benefits. The data is compiled from interviews with 1,693 seriously
impaired workers, representing the population of such workers in the
five states studied. 10 2 Injured workers who applied for but did not
receive workers' compensation benefits are not. represented by the
sample. The 1976 interviews were conducted from five to eight years
after the injury, thereby permitting time for the completion of transitional activities and adjustments.
Wage losses were estimated as the difference between wage income earned in 1976 and an estimate of the wage income that would
have been earned had the person not been injured.10 3 The use of
potential rather than pre-disability wages to estimate wage loss is
similar to the method typically applied
in tort liability suits and to the
04
method used in the 1969 auto study.
The five states surveyed are among the most liberal, in terms of
workers' compensation benefits, in the United States. 05 Thus, apart
from the bias of the assumptions discussed above, inherent in our data
is an overstatement of the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits
for seriously injured workers relative to the national average.

101For a complete description of the survey and sample design, see 7 Makarushka, Chollet &
Frankel, The Health Studies Survey of Workers' Compensation Recipients in New York, Florida,
Wisconsin, Washington, and California: Survey Design and Administration, Interdepartmental
Task Force on Workmen's Compensation Research and Technical Assistance Reports (June 1979)
(available from U.S. Government Printing Office). For a complete discussion of benefit adequacy, see 6 Johnson, Cullinan & Curington, The Adequacy of Workers' Compensation Benefits,
Interdepartmental Task Force on Workmen's Compensation Research and Technical Assistance
Reports (June 1979) (available from U.S. Government Printing Office) [hereinafter cited as
Johnson).
102Those interviewed had permanent impairments equivalent (by reference to the AMA
Guide) of 10% or more of total bodily capacity.
303 The method of wage loss estimation is described in detail in Johnson, supra note 101. See
also Johnson, Curington & Cullinan, Income Security for the Disabled, 18 INDUs. REL. 173
(1979).
'0
The data used in our discussion relates to those who suffered wage losses in 1975 (the "loss
year") whether or not workers' compensation benefits were received in that year. Additionally,
workers" compensation benefits for permanent partial disability are limited in duration and had
expired for 780 of the 1693 persons who received benefits for some period prior to 1975.
Consequently, the 780 persons suffering wage loss but not receiving any compensation in 1975
are included in the data.
Lump sum awards were prorated from the time of the accident to the year in which the
injured person became 65 years old. See Johnson, supra note 101.
I" The five states used were New York, California, Florida, Wisconsin, and Washington.
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The workers' compensation sample is classified into three groups.
The first group (EMPGRP A) consists of persons who worked for
wages for all or part of the year 1975. The second group (EMPGRP B)
is composed of those who returned to work at some time following
their accident but who had not worked at all for twelve months or
more prior to time of interview. Persons in the last group (EMPGRP
C) had not worked at any time after their accident. In general,
EMPGRP A persons are younger and better educated than the others,
equally impaired as those in EMPGRP B, but less severely impaired
than persons in EMPGRP C. Notwithstanding their equal impairment
to those in group B, EMPGRP A workers are more adaptable and
hence, more employable.
The Department o1 Transportation(DOT) Survey of 1969
In 1969 the Westat Corporation, under the auspices of the United
States Department of Transportation, interviewed 1,037 persons who
had been "seriously injured" in auto accidents. The definition of
"serious injury" includes a large number of cases in which the severity
of injury is much less than that in our workers' compensation sample.10 8 Comparisons, however, are based on persons with total economic losses of $10,000 or more. This category represents wage losses
equivalent to those of the 1976 Workers' Compensation Survey. 0 7 The
data that we present on compensation is net of attorneys' fees.
Pre-Workers' Compensation Negligence
The data contained in Table 1 under "Negligence" is based on
estimates of the amount of recovery which would have been awarded
workers had their claims been litigated under traditional negligence
rules prior to the enactment of workers' compensation laws. From the
early estimates that seventy to ninety percent of pre-workers' compensation injuries went uncompensated, we assume that only six to thirty
percent of injured employees recovered. 0 8 For simplicity, we also
initially assume that each worker who did receive an award recovered
one hundred percent of his wage loss 109 and that no plaintiff received
compensation for pain and suffering." 0 Finally, we assume that the

106
DEPARTMENT oF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 82, at 11. The complete study includes
fatalities, an additional sample from court files, and a sample of insurance carrier claims. The
report contains a complete description of the survey and sample design.
107

See infra note 120.

10 See W. Paossmi, supra note 16, at 530 n.32.
109This assumption is relaxed in the penultimate paragraph of the next section.
310 This assumption has the effect of overstating the compensation for wage loss, as such,
provided under a negligence system.
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average loss of those employees who did not recover is equal to the
average loss of those who did recover.
Comparison of the Health Studies Survey and Pre-Workers'
Compensation Negligence Results
Before comparing in detail the workers' compensation and automobile negligence recoveries, we offer a rough comparison of the
workers' compensation data and the fragmentary pre-workers' compensation negligence data described above. As the data in Table 1
indicate, a six percent recovery rate results in a lower total wage loss
compensation than that now provided by workers' compensation. In
total, the hypothetical awards under the six percent standard are
approximately sixty-eight percent of the total workers' compensation
benefits in 1975. At the thirty percent upper limit of recovery based on
the experience of the early 1900's, the total wage loss compensation is
nearly three and one-half times the amount provided by workers'
compensation.
These comparisons are very approximate at best and are seriously
weakened by the assumptions discussed above. On the other hand,
consider the fact that the six percent to thirty percent recovery ratios
are cited as evidence of the inadequacies of negligence systems in the
early 1900's and that we have applied them to workers in the most
liberal workers' compensation state plans in the 1970's. Based on this
fact alone, one would expect that the comparison would indicate a
clear superiority, in terms of wage loss compensation adequacy, for
workers' compensation. Instead, we find that except at the lower
levels of the estimated recovery rate under "old" negligence systems,
the negligence approach might generate more adequate levels of wage
loss compensation. In terms of our data, for example, the point at
which workers' compensation and negligence generate equal wage loss
compensation occurs when only about nine percent of negligence
claimants recover.
Our discussion has so far assumed that those who received negligence awards recovered one hundred percent of their wage losses. If
one were to assume that successful negligence claimants recovered
only fifty percent of those losses then the equal wage loss compensation point would occur at an eighteen percent recovery rate.
If it serves no other purpose, this comparison is useful as a
warning against concluding that one approach is superior to the other
by reference to the theoretical inadequacies of either approach considered in isolation.
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Comparison with Contemporary Negligence Systems
(1969 DOT Survey)
TABLE 2
CLAIMS AND AWARDS UNDER AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE
6.

5.

4.

3.

2.

i.

8

7.

KX
PERCENTAGE

PROBABILITY

OF

OF

NUMBER
RECEIVING
TORT
SETTLEMENT

RECOVERY
FOR
ALL
CLAIMANTS

AVERAGE
ECONOMIC
LOSS,

AVERAGE
NET
TORT
RECOVERY

RECOVERY
FOR
SUCCESSFUL
CLAIMANTS

RECOVERY
FOR
ALL
CLAIMANTS

15.038
12.85
27.883

.69
.55
.62

$18625
T7.385
44,618

$10.M9
7.897
9.174

.64
.10
.21

.44
06
13

OF
TOTAL
ECONOMIC
LOSS
$10,000.24.999
25,00+
TOTAL
SOURCE:

NUMBER
NUMBER
OF
OF
PERSONS CLAIMANTS
28.491
31.139
59.630

I U.S. D

9
.. K.
PERCENTAGE

21.899
23.199
45.09

uzwmm" or Tmw o-rAmo.. EcoNoMC Comw

-cm

or A

o-u.

Accmr INF

(19).

* C.aculated 1. pwioo who mrived sel-nlrIu.

A more meaningful and more detailed basis for comparison is
provided by the data from the DOT survey. As we have indicated, the
experience of seriously injured persons under the negligence approach
to auto accidents is used as an indicator of how workers might fare
under a contemporary negligence approach to occupational injury.
The data is sufficiently detailed to permit us to examine separately the
probability of recovery and the amount of recovery.
It is useful at the outset to reiterate our prior theoretical equation
describing the difference in net compensation between fault and nofault systems:
(5) E(BN - Bs) = (7rNKl - 7rsKs) (WL + MED) + TrKN (PS)
If we make the assumption that

7rN represents

the composite probabil-

ity of recovery under the negligence approach to auto injury,"' then
the difference in compensation between negligence and no-fault can
be represented by the following equation:
(8) E(BN - B,) =

rrNKXN

(WL + MED + PS) - 7rsKs (WL
+ MED)

As in the case of the workers' compensation/negligence model, this
equation demonstrates that some of the added benefits which negligence provides (BN) are attributable to compensation for pain and
suffering. Unlike the recovery ratios for workers' compensation,
which pertain to wage losses but not medical losses, the negligence
data provides recovery ratios in the form of total recovery to total
"I We also

assume that -r" does not vary with the use of attorneys.
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losses. Our analysis of the negligence data assumes that the recoveryto-loss ratios for wage loss compensation are the same as the ratios for
total losses. We have previously assumed total recovery for medical
loss under workers' compensation.
The Compensation Objective
As indicated in Table 2, there were 59,630 persons seriously
injured in auto accidents who suffered economic losses of $10,000 or
more. Of this total, approximately seventy-six percent (45,098) made
a claim for damages.
The data on this group of claimants is used to calculate the
probability of recovery (it"r) and the proportion of benefits received as
compared to losses for those who received negligence awards (KN).
These estimates can be compared to the corresponding variables contained in Table 1 (Workers' Compensation Benefits) in order to determine the differences in recovery between the two systems. However,
in the discussion that follows, because we have no data for the recovery ratios for medical expenses under workers' compensation, we take
workers' compensation wage loss recovery data as a measure of total
recovery and describe it symbolically as K, rather than the more
precise Ks). This approach has the effect of assuming that recovery
ratios for medical expenses are equal to the recovery ratios for wage
losses. Thus, our comparisons will understate the compensation adequacy of workers' compensation if the recovery ratios for medical costs
are higher than those for wage losses, as they are generally designed to
be under workers' compensation. The degree of overstatement will
depend not only on the differences, if any, in recovery ratios, but also
on the proportion of medical losses to total losses. Where the medical
losses are small compared to wage losses, the overstatement will be
proportionately reduced.
If we assume that injured workers suing under a tort system
would have been as successful as the auto accident claimants in terms
of their recovery, it is clear from our figures that the average net wage
loss compensation for all tort claimants would have been greater than
what was received from workers' compensation. That is, the average
ratio of compensation to losses for the entire group of successful negligence claimants is approximately .21,112 whereas the comparable ratio
of benefits to wage losses for the entire group under workers' compen2itThis figure is indicated in the last column, bottom line of Table 2 and is arrived at by
setting up a ratio of Average Net Tort Recovery to Average Economic Loss:
9,174
44,616
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sation is .09.113 This greater average recovery is achieved, however,
at the expense of eliminating benefits to unsuccessful negligence
claimants. As indicated in Table 2, only sixty-two percent of the total
number of claimants were compensated. Consequently, thirty-eight
percent of all claimants failed to recover any benefits. 1 4 Conversely,
we have assumed that one hundred percent of the injured workers in
Table 1 received some recovery, though it is a lesser percentage (nine
5
percent) of total wage loss."
By multiplying the probability of recovery experienced by all
negligence claimants by the average recovery of successful negligence
claimants, we can calculate the expected recovery of all negligence
claimants (rNKN)1 6 and compare it to the expected recovery under
workers' compensation where we assume that all claimants recovered
(i.e., wsks = Ks)." 7 The results show expected recovery for all negligence claimants to be thirteen percent of losses" 8 as compared to a
nine percent wage loss recovery rate under workers' compensation. "9
With our data, it is possible to distinguish between the different
wage loss categories. According to the auto negligence figures, approximately sixty-nine percent of claimants in the $10,000 - $24,999
category received compensation (i.e.,r"N = .69). For those claimants
who recovered, the average award equalled sixty-four percent of the
average loss (i.e., K, = .64). In the largest wage loss group
($25,000 + ), both the probability of recovery (lr"N = .55) and the proportion of loss compensated (KN = .10) were substantially lower.
In the workers' compensation context, it is reasonable to assume
that EMPGRP A of Table 1 will experience a total economic loss that
is comparable to the $10,000 - $24,999 category in the auto accident
data. Likewise, EMPGRP's B and C are most like the auto accident
claimants in the $25,000 + category. 120 Consequently, the workers'
113This figure is computed by examining the ratio of Total Workers' Compensation Wage

Loss Benefits to Total Wage Loss (Table 1):

633,178

7,213,341
14 It should be noted that this group of uncompensated claimants creates a cost to society
since welfare payments and/or funds from charities, friends or relatives may provide needed
compensation.
Is Note also that if the injured workers' experience under a negligence system paralleled that
of the seriously injured victims of auto accidents, the hypothetical negligence system would only
compensate approximately one-half (55%) of the injured workers with the largest losses, i.e.,
those with minimum losses of $25,000.
118 See Table 2, bottom line, column 9.
117 See Table 1, bottom line, column 4.
18 See Table 2, bottom line, column 9.
n See Table 1, bottom line, column 4. Note that our calculation also assumes that unsuccessful claimants had the same average economic losses as the successful claimants in the comparable
wage loss categories.
120 As previously indicated, the great majority of EMPGRP B and C employees had permanently withdrawn from the labor force as of the time of the workers' compensation survey. The
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compensation recipients in employment Group A experienced a .07
ratio of benefits to wage losses (Ks = .07)121 as compared to the .64
ratio of recovery to losses (KN = .64) experienced by successful tort

claimants situated in the lower loss category.122 On the other hand,
EMPGRP's B and C together were compensated at a rate of ten
percent of their wage losses (i.e., K,= .10)123 as compared to the
equivalent ten percent rate experienced by the compensated tort

24 Again, by multiclaimants in the $25,000 + wage loss category.1
plying 7rNKN for the different loss categories and comparing them to
the K, for the corresponding workers' compensation wage-loss categories, we find that expected recovery for all negligence claimants in the
25
smaller loss category is forty-four percent,' compared to seven per-

cent for workers' compensation;' 2 6 whereas for the larger loss category, expected recovery under negligence is six2 8percent' 27 as compared
to ten percent under workers' compensation.'
A number of inferences can be drawn from these comparisons.
One is that the negligence approach, as compared to the workers'
average annual wage losses in these categories were $9,261 and $9,550 respectively in 1975. This
means that workers in both categories would reach the total average economic loss figure for the
$25,000 + DOT injury category in less than 8.4 years ($77,385/9,261; $77,385/9,550)-less than
5 years beyond the 1975 loss year of the workers" compensation survey, yet still within the
projected average work life of the group. When medical losses under workers' compensation are
taken into account, the average DOT loss figure for the $25,000 + category would be attained
even sooner. We consider EMPGRP A injuries in the Workers' Compensation Survey to roughly
equal the injuries in the $10,000-$24,999 total economic loss category in the DOT study on the
basis of the following reasoning. Workers in EMPGRP A sustained average annual wage losses of
$3,899 (Table 1, column 2) compared to an average total economic loss of $16,625 sustained in
the $10,000-$24,999 category in the DOT Survey (Table 2, column 6). Thus in 4.26 years
($16,625/$3,899) of average annual wage loss, EMPGRP A workers would have reached the
$16,665 average net recovery experienced in the $10,000-$24,999 loss category. Based on data
collected during the workers' compensation survey we know that by the loss year (1975-one
year before the survey and generally four years after the year of injury), most EMPGRP A
employees had returned to work and were no longer sustaining annual wage losses. By assuming
an average disability period of three years for EMPCRP A employees, we arrive at an average
loss figure in the range of $11,697. Thus, when medical losses under workers' compensation are
taken into account, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that EMPGRP A workers sustained
wage losses most like those in the $10,000-$24,999 DOT wage loss category; and that few, if
any, losses of EMPGRP A employees approached the $77,385 average losses sustained by
claimants in the $25,000 + loss category of the DOT data.
' See Table 1, top line, column 4. This figure is arrived at by computing the ratio of workers'
211,523
compensation benefits (top line, column 3) to wage loss (top line, column 1):
3,111,048
'~
See Table 2, top line, column 8.
"
See Table 1, second line, column 4.
11

See Table 2, middle line, column 8.

See Table 2, top line, column 9.
See Table 1, top line, column 4.
117 See Table 2, middle line, column 9.
123
'

118

See Table 1, second line, column 4.
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compensation alternative, tends to better compensate those with
somewhat smaller losses. A second inference is that for the largest
losses, the ratio of compensation to losses for successful negligence
claimants is identical to that for injured workers in the comparable
wage loss category.129 The third result is that the total wage loss
recoveries under either system are less than one half of the total losses
incurred (nine percent in the workers' compensation context and
twenty-one percent with respect to successful automobile negligence
claimants).
The award to loss ratio under negligence increases as one moves
into the less than $10,000 category of economic loss. It would appear,
therefore, that the negligence system provides greater wage loss benefits than workers' compensation for high probability, low cost accidents.1 30 Since most injuries result from these accidents, it is not
suprising that one finds that total wage loss benefits under negligence
are greater than those under the strict liability approach. Consequently, from the viewpoint of potential victims facing the full array
of risks of injury, the negligence system would be preferred in terms of
wage loss. One must, of course, realize that potential victims may
value the reduction in uncertainty inherent in a no-fault approach to
such an extent that they are willing to sacrifice some of the potential
benefits under negligence. The only valid test of 1that question would
be to permit those at risk to make such a choice. 31
For persons facing risks of severe (high loss) injury, the expected
wage loss recovery would appear more attractive under workers' compensation than under negligence although neither approach compensates victims for more than ten percent of their wage losses.
The data is not sufficiently general nor the method of comparison
so rigorous as to support a claim that the results permit rigorous
statistical inferences. On the basis of the empirical evidence, however,
one cannot infer that the shift from negligence to a no-fault liability
system has resulted in more adequate compensation for injured work32

ers. 1

119 One should not make too much of the equality, since the procedure is, of necessity,

approximate. It would be sufficient, for our purposes, to view the ratios as not being widely
different.
,30It should be noted that no-fault automobile statutes frequently apply only to large claims.
Thus, common law recovery is often denied where our data show it is most favorable to victims.
See J. 0' CONNELL & R. HENDESON, supra note 9, at 907-15.
131 Mishan, Evaluationof Life and Limb: A TheoreticalApproach,J. POL. EcoN. 687, 703-05

(1971).
13?In the foregoing analysis, we compared the expected recovery for successful claimants and
all claimants under both systems and provided further breakdown in terms of severity of injury.
However, from the viewpoint of the potential victim, it might be suggested that a more
meaningful comparison of the systems is the expected recovery whether or not a claim is filed.
Unfortunately, neither of our sets of data provides any information on the extent of recoveries of
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The Deterrence Objective
We cannot, from the available data, determine the most efficient
method of promoting risk avoidance through cost allocations between
employer and employee. Yet, judged against the explicit or implicit
ideals of each system, it appears that both workers' compensation and
negligence allocate too much of the accident costs to employees and
too little of those costs to employers.
Under the ideal standard of workers' compensation, employers
(either directly or through their insurance premiums) are expected to
bear 2/3 of the wage losses. 33 The data in Table 1 shows that
$6,580,163134 or 91.2% of such total annual accident costs were not
paid through workers' compensation in the five states examined. As
persons who did not file claims. Yet, the DOT study does furnish data, which together with some
speculative assumptions may be used to further compare the two systems. Specifically, the
negligence data shows that 14,532 persons, almost 25% of those injured, failed to file claims.
This percentage is roughly constant for both categories of injury (23% for the low-loss
category and 26% for the high-loss category). Many reasons may exist for the failure to file a
claim under the negligence system. These include: (1) the receipt of a settlement without the
filing of a claim; (2) the determination by the claimant or his counsel that the claim was not
entitled to compensation or would not be worth prosecuting; and (3) ignorance of rights under
the negligence system.
Proponents of the negligence system might argue that the effective threat of filing a claim
coupled with the higher expected recovery will occasion many settlements with a lower attendant administrative cost borne by the victim. Conversely, supporters of no-fault liability might
argue that a substantial number of the nonclaimants receive no settlement for their negligence
claims but would have been compensated under the "universal" coverage of workers' compensation.
If we assume, contrary to the most likely probability, that none of the nonclaimants
received settlements, and if we further assume that the average losses for the nonfilers within
each category of loss were no different from the average losses of the successful claimants, than
by dividing the number of successful claimants by the number of persons injured we can
calculate the probability of recovery (rr) and the expected recovery (ir". K,) for all persons who
sustained injuries in Table 2, in a way that understates the compensation provided by the
negligence system. Further, if we assume that all injured persons file claims and recover under
workers' compensation, then the probability of recovery and expected recovery for all persons
facing injuries under both systems is as follows:
2

Low Cost Injuries
High Cost Injuries
Total

.53
.41
.47

,.

,K,
.34
.04
.1

TSKS
.07
.10
.09

We see from these figures that even under these assumptions so unfavorable to the operation
of negligence principles, the expected negligence wage loss recovery is once again superior to
workers' compensation benefits for the entire range of accidents and for the higher-probability,
low-cost accidents, but is decidedly inferior for the lower-probability, higher-cost accidents.
1'3 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
"3 This result was arrived at by subtracting total workers' compensation wage loss benefits
from total wage loss:
7,213,341

-

633,178

6,580,163
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such, only 8.8% of those losses were borne by employers through
workers' compensation. Since the states studied are among the most
liberal in terms of coverage and benefits, one would expect the national average for employer-assumed wage losses to be even lower.
By comparison, defendants in the DOT study (taken as proxies
35
for employers) were able to avoid only eighty-seven percent1 of

claimant losses. In other words, thirteen percent of such losses were
provided for by negligence defendants. This suggests that in allocating
wage losses the negligence system provides somewhat greater safety
incentives than those provided by workers' compensation, though it
appears that under either system employees may be overinvesting and
employers may be underinvesting in safety.
It is true, of course, that workers' compensation plans are based
on shared strict liability. Workers are expected to bear a share of
accident costs, thereby inducing workers to avoid accidents. This
objective is typically expressed by the statutory provisions limiting
workers' compensation benefits to some proportion of pre-injury
wages. The actual maxima vary among states but as previously mentioned, a frequently expressed "ideal" standard is sixty-six and twothirds percent of pre-injury wages (not tax adjusted). The data in
Table 1 shows, however, that the proportion of wage loss allocated to
workers is far in excess of the thirty-three and one-third percent
138
suggested by the ideal standard.

Thus, the data indicates that the negligence system better meets
the ideal allocational goals of workers' compensation than does workers' compensation itself.
According to the putative efficiency-oriented principles of the
negligence approach to recovery, all wage losses of successful claimants should be imposed on employers at fault. 137 Yet, considering the
negligence data in Table 2 as the proxy for a negligence alternative to
workers' compensation, we find that only twenty-one percent of losses
of the successful claimants would be imposed on negligent employers 138 with seventy-nine percent of such losses being imposed on the
nonnegligent victims. In allocating wage losses, the workers' compen'3

See Table 2, bottom line, column 9.

118See Table 1, bottom line, column 4.
137 This proposition assumes that principles of comparative negligence are not involved. See
supra note 38. In a comparative negligence jurisdiction, it might be impossible to assess empirically the allocation of costs in terms of a systemic ideal because of the difficulty in determining
what proportion of uncompensated losses, if any, was not traceable to the fact finder's determination of the relative contribution of the victim's negligence. Consequently, efficiency considerations taking into account comparative negligence rules are beyond the scope of this analysis.
This indeterminancy may also be operating sub rosa in pure negligence systems; but if so, it does
so contrary to the expressed ideal.
'3 See Table 2, bottom line, column 8.
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sation data in Table 1 falls even shorter of an efficient deterrence
objective by allocating only nine percent of the wage losses to employers, and by imposing ninety-one percent on employees.

3

Thus, judged against the sixty-six and two-thirds percent employer allocational ideal of workers' compensation, and the one hundred percent allocational principle of pure negligence, both systems
overallocate costs to the victims and underallocate such costs to the
nonvictims. Judged by either standard, the workers' compensation
system errs more in the wrong direction than does the negligence
alternative.
Based on the belief that dollar for dollar, one "buys" more incremental deterrence from nonvictims than from victims,

40

the negli-

gence data appears superior to the workers' compensation alternative. 14

1

C. The Impact of Other Reparations Systems
TABLE 3
PAYMENTS FROM SOCIAL AND PRIVATE
INSURANCE TO INJURED WORKERS 1975
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

WAGE
LOSS

WORK.
COMP.
BENEFITS

SOCIAL
INSUR.

EMPLOYER/
UNION
PLAN

NONCOMPENSATED
LOSS

EMPGRP A
EMPGRP B
EMPGRP C

$3,111,048
2,278,182
1,824,111

$211,523
152,470
269,185

$ 331,034
426,795
371,943

$ 38,116
123,252
56,601

$2,530,375
1,575,665
1,126,382

TOTAL

$7,213,341

$633,178

$1,129,772

$217,969

$5,232,422

100%

9%

16%

3%

72%

%
SOURCE:

SY1RACUSE

UNivssrry-THE

COMPENSATION

HEALTH STUDIES PROGRAM, WAGE

BENEFrrs-THE SURVEY

OF WORKES'

LossEs

AND WOR

COMPENSATION

(1976).

As previously discussed, one cannot assess the operation of workers' compensation or negligence-based recovery in terms of their ob42
jectives without considering the effect of other reparation systems.1
The general impact of such systems is to reduce victim safety incentives by supplementing the compensation received without directly
See Table 3, bottom line, column 2.
o See supra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
341 These comparisons on deterrence should be tempered by the recognition that the allocation
of medical and other losses and the resulting deterrent effect may be substantially different.
142 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
"I

'
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be liable accordallocating costs to nonvictims who would otherwise
43
ing to the ideals of legal liability systems.
As indicated in Table 3, a substantial portion of the payments
which injured workers may expect to receive come from social and
private insurance programs. Workers received approximately 27.5%
of their annual wage loss from all sources. Of this total, approximately
nine percent was from workers' compensation, 15.7% from social
insurance, and three percent from private insurance or labor union
pension and disability plans. In the following discussion, we describe
these programs and analyze data relating to their operation which
was provided by the 1976 Workers' Compensation Survey.
Social Insurance
Although social insurance was not an important institution during the early years of workers' compensation, it is an enormously
important one now. In the context of disabled employees, the major
type of social insurance is Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI).144 During 1975, the workers represented by our five state sam-

ple received $1,129,772 in income from public programs. 4 5 From
data not presented in Table 3, we know that almost one-half (forty-six
percent) of this amount came from DI.
For purposes of this article, perhaps the most important fact
concerning the DI program is that it supplied nearly as much income
to these injured workers as did workers' compensation ($519,695 vs.
$633,178).146 All other public programs combined, including welfare

programs, paid $610,053 to the injured workers in 1975.
Thus, workers' compensation benefits represented only thirtytwo percent of all benefits paid in 1975.147 In addition, it is important to realize that although they compensate victims as do other
reparation systems, neither DI nor any of the other public programs
allocate the costs for such payments specifically to employers through
the tax structure because the tax rates do not differentiate among
employers on the basis of the firm's accident rates.
143 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
144 DI eligibility need not be work-related. It is based on the accumulation of a requisite

number of quarters of covered employment and the satisfaction of medical criteria adjusted for
the age and occupational experience of the claimant. Benefit amounts are based on predisability
earnings and are adjusted to reflect the number of dependents in the disabled person's household.

See Table 3, bottom line, column 3.
It should be noted, however, that since eligibility is based on permanent and total disability, no DI benefits were paid to persons in Employment Group A.
145
140

147

633,178
1,908,919
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As indicated in Table 3, the net effect of social insurance payments to the injured worker is to increase the adequacy of compensation and theoretically to reduce the victim's economic incentives for
safety. Yet, given the fact that workers still bear a large portion of the
wage losses from their injuries (in addition to pain and suffering), it is
probable that the reduction in workers' incentives is not very significant. More importantly, the increase in compensation entails no increase in costs to firms in which accidents occur. Thus, social insurance effectively subsidizes the costs of accidents to these firms. For any
inherent level of risk, firms that have an above average number of
accidents receive a larger subsidy than their less risky counterparts.
Private Insurance
The role of private wage loss insurance is less well understood,
but it is nonetheless another important source of compensation to
injured workers. In 1975, a total of $217,969 was paid to the workers
we studied by private employer insurance plans or by labor union
pension and disability plans.' 48 Employer insurance plans are normally purchased by the employer for the workers' benefit in lieu of
higher money wages. Union plans are largely financed by the workers. Depending upon relative bargaining power, the costs of such
plans may or may not be shared by the employer. To the extent that
the costs of these forms of insurance are not borne by employers, the
cost incentives for safety are limited to the workers.' 4
The Impact of the CollateralSource Rule
Workers' compensation benefits and some private plan benefits
are offset by DI benefits. Under a negligence system, however, by
virtue of the collateral source rule, the payments from social insurance
and private insurance not paid by the employer would not reduce the
employer's liability. 150 Therefore, in considering the impact of other
reparations systems on workers' compensation and negligence, one
should remember that less of the collateral source payments will be
received by workers' compensation victims than by successful negligence plaintiffs and consequently such payments will have the effect
of further reducing the incentives placed on employers under workers'
compensation as compared with those under negligence systems.
When payments from other reparation systems are taken into account
14SUnfortunately this data cannot be separated according to source (i.e., employer vs. union
plans).
119A. CoNmaw, supra note 1, at 33.
150See supra notes 1 & 59.
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and the rules for allocating those payments among the parties are
considered, the result is that less compensation is allocated to the
injured, and lower economic safety incentives are allocated to the

nonvictims under workers' compensation than under the negligence
alternative. ' 5 1
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have attempted to contribute to a better understanding of the

relative merits of no-fault and negligence systems by clarifying the
issues relevant to a reasoned evaluation of the two approaches. In
addition, we have presented data that permits an approximate comparison of how persons covered by a well-known no-fault system such
as workers' compensation might fare in terms of wage loss recovery
5 2
under a contemporary negligence approach.1
Taking the data at face value, we can offer certain observations.
First, the negligence approach to occupational injury provides a

higher expected wage loss recovery than workers' compensation for
most types of injuries, and for all injury taken together, but a lower
's, It appears then that the performance of workers' compensation could be improved by
applying to the system the collateral source rules generally applied in negligence. But see
Bernstein, supra note 37, at 543; Epstein, Coordinating Workers' Compensation Benefits With
Tort Damage Awards, 13 FoRuM 464-79 (1978); O'Connell, Workers' Compensation as a Sole
Remedy, supra note 37.
152 At this point, it may be beneficial to recall the simplifying assumptions we made in this
article and point out the limitations in our data which may bias or qualify the results set forth in
our analysis.
In this regard, there are several factors which have the effect of overstating the compensation provided by workers' compensation as compared with negligence: (1) The administrative
costs of workers' compensation was assumed to be zero: (2) All workers who applied for workers'
compensation were assumed to have been compensated; (3) All workers' compensation beneficiaries recieved 2/3 of their wage losses; and (4) The workers' compensation data is drawn from five
of the most generous jurisdictions and are therefore more favorable in terms of compensation
than the typical workers' compensation system in operation.
In addition, the following assumptions effect a bias in favor of understating the compensation provided by workers' compensation as compared to negligence. (1) Recovery-to-loss ratios
for workers' compensation are limited to wage losses and do not include medical losses or
benefits; (2) The only administrative cost considered to be borne by plaintiffs was the cost of
attorneys' fees; and (3) All negligence awards were considered compensation awards with no
awards for pain and suffering.
We are uncertain as to the bias occasioned by the following additional assumptions: (1)
victims are neutral in terms of their preferences as to differential risk of recovery; (2) their time
value of money is no different from that suggested by market rates; (3) the average losses of
unsuccessful claimants and persons who did not file claims in the case of negligence were equal to
the average losses of those who filed and recovered; and (4) the automobile negligence data is a
fair proxy of how the negligence approach to occupational injury would have evolved had it not
been replaced by workers' compensation. But see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
Taken together, we believe that the net bias from the foregoing factors tends to overstate the
advantage of workers' compensation in terms of compensation adequacy.
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expected wage loss recovery ratio for lower probability, higher cost
injuries. Although under negligence total wage loss recovery would be
larger for the low cost accidents and for all accidents taken together, a
substantially higher proportion of injured workers would receive no
compensation in all three of the categories. Inasmuch as employers
bear less of the costs of accidents under workers compensation than
under negligence (nine percent vs. thirteen percent), it might be
suggested that broader distribution of payments to a greater number
of injured workers under workers' compensation programs has been
achieved at the expense of nonnegligent workers who could expect
greater recovery under negligence rules and not at the expense of
employers who pay less under workers' compensation than under
negligence, and who likewise might be seen as enjoying a subsidy
financed by nonnegligent workers.
The operation of workers' compensation and the negligence alternative must be considered in the context of other reparations systems.
Available data indicates that such systems serve to enhance the compensation adequacy of victims under both systems, although less under workers' compensation than under negligence. But such systems
generally fail to allocate the corresponding costs to parties which the
competing liability systems (if they operated according to their expressed or implicit ideals) may hold liable. Rather, it seems that the
additional compensation for injured employees is paid by taxpayers
and insurance, financed only in small part by employers. If the various systems were coordinated so as to achieve a higher portion of
compensation through negligence and workers' compensation rather
than through social insurance, employers would be provided with
greater incentives for safety. Conversely, to satisfy the compensation
adequacy objective through social and private insurance might be
seen to dilute deterrence objectives. Under negligence rules, the operation of the collateral source rule seems in theory to preserve for the
victims more payments from other reparations systems, whereas contrary principles in typical workers' compensation programs apply such
payments to reduce employer obligations, thus simultaneously reducing compensation benefits and employer economic safety incentives.
It also appears that the savings of attorneys' fees under the nofault approach is not reflected by higher wage loss benefits to the
average workers' compensation client. While a variety of reasons for
this fact can be advanced, it is clear that the data does not support the
claim that, by eliminating the costs of determining fault, the wage loss
benefits to victims are increased.
Although no-fault liability and negligence differ in terms of the
deterrence provided by cost allocation, the differences are overshad-
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owed by the more fundamental conclusion that benefits are such a
low proportion of the total costs of accidents that neither system is
likely to provide significant employer cost-based deterrence based, on
wage loss allocation.
We suggest that the debate on fault and no-fault approaches
would be enhanced by additional research on the allocation of all
costs, and that more attention should be given to the measurement of
the full administrative costs of both approaches and to the consideration of the influence of social and private insurance on compensation
and deterrence.
Perhaps the most remarkable observation which can be made is
that despite approximately three-quarters of a century of public concern and controversy, one cannot conclude, on the basis of data
generally cited to demonstrate the superiority of workers' compensation over negligence, that workers' compensation has effected an improvement in terms of the wage loss compensation and deterrence
objectives over the evolving negligence system it replaced.

